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REASONABLE DOUBTS ABOUT
REASONABLE NONBELIEF
Douglas V. Henry

In Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, J. L. Schellenberg argues that the
phenomenon of "reasonable nonbelief" constitutes sufficient reason to doubt
the existence of God. In this essay I assert the reasonableness of entertain
ing doubts about the kind of reasonable nonbelief that Schellenberg needs
for a cogent argument. Treating his latest set of arguments in this journal,
I dispute his claims about the scope and status of "unreflective nonbelief,"
his assertion that God would prevent reasonable nonbelief "of any kind and
duration," and his confidence that we can know that some doubters are not
self-deceived.

In "Does Reasonable Nonbelief Exist?" (DRNE)1 I described John
Schellenberg's atheological argument in Divine Hiddenness and Human
Reason (DH)2 as a worthy effort. Yet while I admire DH, I remain uncon
vinced that its argument is sound. Indeed, Schellenberg's recent reply,
"On Reasonable Nonbelief and Perfect Love" (ORN),3 demonstrates anew
some of his argument's deficiencies. To see how this is so I will review his
argument and my initial critique, and then offer an appraisal of his latest
set of responses.
I
Schellenberg's argument is deceptively simple. At DH, p. 81 he argues:
(P1) If there is a God, he is perfectly loving.
(P2) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur.
(P3) Reasonable nonbelief occurs.4
(P4) No perfectly loving God exists.
(P5) There is no God.
In DRNE I argued that the kind of reasonable nonbelief needed for a co
gent argument is unlikely to exist. To preclude shoddy investigation or
self-deception, Schellenberg looks to persons of high intellectual and moral
virtue who have adequately investigated God's existence. They combine
"exemplary investigative procedure, great expenditure of time and energy,
honesty in other situations, love for truth, rational self-control, and . . .
desire to have the issue responsibly settled" (DRNE, p. 80). Given the am
biguity of the evidence, they are not swayed either way. They apparently
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cannot be faulted for their doubt since they have done their best to settle
the issue. Yet on closer analysis, I argued, persons such as Schellenberg
stipulates are rare. Further, the factors he identifies do not guarantee ad
equate investigation. Even if they did, the result would be "persistent, con
tinued seeking" (DRNE, p. 82), and if one remains on a quest to discern
God's existence, it is hard to see the evil that worries Schellenberg. After
all, the determined will to find God is a step toward the "ultimate and
perfect happiness" that lies in the divine vision, insofar as "rectitude of
will is required for happiness both antecedently and concomitantly."5 Far
from bereft, such persons are near the God who assures, "those who seek
me diligently find me" (Prv 8:17).
In his latest essay, Schellenberg offers three complaints about my cri
tique.6 First, I "assume that reasonable nonbelief is reasonable doubt,"
limiting my attention to reflective forms of reasonable nonbelief (ORN, p.
330). Since reasonable nonbelief includes both reflective and nonreflective
instances, even if my critique succeeded, "nothing follows for nonbelief in
general, since plenty of instances of nonbelief do not presuppose reflec
tion" (ORN, p. 331). Second, I overlook his "starting point in reflection
on the nature of Divine Love" (ORN, p. 334). Instead, I reconstruct his
argument "'from below,' guided by independent consideration of what
reasonable nonbelief might be and the justifications a God might have for
permitting it," instead of "from above," whereby one can see that "God
would not permit inculpable nonbelief of any kind or for any duration"
(ORN, p. 334). Third, I insufficiently attend to the grounds under which
worries about self-deception are justified. Rejecting my concern that self
deception "is always a possibility, and can perhaps never reasonably be
ruled out," Schellenberg says we "sometimes have good grounds for be
lieving an individual to be honest . . . and also that some doubters are
honest" (ORN, p. 332).
Each complaint has answers, so that it is reasonable to doubt the exis
tence of the kind of reasonable nonbelief Schellenberg needs for a cogent
argument. Before those answers, however, note a general problem for his
argument. Put simply, if the standards for reasonable nonbelief are strin
gent, it becomes plausible to hold that they are never met, while if they
are more relaxed, it is dubious that God would of necessity prevent such
nonbelief from occurring. This is why the nonbelief needed for his argu
ment to persuade is hard to come by. The kind of reasonable nonbelief
most readily identified is least likely to throw a wrench into the work of
divine love. The kind of reasonable nonbelief "left over" is most likely
to be deficient in one way or another. This tension plays out in the ways
Schellenberg variously falls back on either P2 or P3, with his efforts to
shore up one or the other premise always making the other less plausible.
II
Schellenberg argues that whatever holds for reflective nonbelief, we may
rest assured that inculpable, unreflective nonbelief abounds. There are
"first of all, individuals—primarily from non-Western cultures—who
have never so much as entertained the proposition 'God exists' (G), let
alone considered the question of its truth or falsity." There also are those,
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"from both Western and non-Western backgrounds, who are to some ex
tent familiar with the idea of God, but who have never considered with
any degree of seriousness whether it is instantiated" (DH, p. 58).
Several issues problematize retreat to unreflective nonbelief. First, in
DH Schellenberg limits his attention to reasonable doubt. Of unreflective
nonbelief, he simply says, it "seems clear enough that [it] is inculpably
exemplified" (59) and then moves on. Thus, his claim that my skepticism
about P3 is "not only unsupported but false" rings a bit hollow (ORN, p.
331). Second, though his latest essay gives grounds for the inculpability of
unreflective nonbelief, he makes some questionable factual and normative
assumptions. Many persons, he says, have never had "the theistic idea
. . . squarely before their minds, and so have never been in a position to
respond to it at all, whether culpably or inculpably" (ORN, p. 331). Also,
some acquainted with the idea of God have "due to formative factors of
upbringing and/or culture beyond their control, never been in a position
to see the importance of thinking about it, and so have also never been in
a position to respond to it in one way or the other" (ORN, p. 331). Both
the factual and normative assumptions underlying Schellenberg's claims
are arguable.
To turn first to the facts, consider Tertullian's anima naturaliter Christiana—the soul that is by nature Christian.7 Tertullian is often overlooked
but germane to the problem of the prejudicially dubbed "jungle savage"
that is without God, for his interest lies with the "unreflective" masses,
those who are "simple, rude, uncultured and untaught."8 Such souls' tes
timonies are "simple as true, commonplace as simple, universal as com
monplace, natural as universal, divine as natural," and alike in witnessing
to the reality of God.9 "Is it a wonderful thing," he asks, "if, being the gift
of God to man, [the soul] knows how to divine? Is it anything very strange,
if it knows the God by whom it was bestowed?"10 "All the world over,"
he concludes, "is found the witness of the soul" to God.11 Even now, an
thropologists and ethnographers regularly discern among non-Westerners
something akin to Tertullian's anima naturaliter Christiana.
Andrew Lang and Wilhelm Schmidt offer the classic ethnographic
treatments of the issue.12 Lang believes that we "may conceivably have
something to learn . . . from the rough observations and hasty inferences
of the most backward races."13 Challenging Edward Tylor's theory that the
evolution of religion progressed through ancestor worship, spiritualism,
henotheism, and ultimately monotheism, Lang documents how "the idea
of God, as he is conceived of by our inquiring plain man, occurs rudely,
but recognizably, in the lowest-known grades of savagery."14 He corrects
errant assumptions about "savage" religion, for of "the existence of a be
lief in a Supreme Being . . . there is as good evidence as we possess for
any fact in the ethnographic region" and it "is certain that savages, when
first approached by curious travelers, and missionaries, have again and
again recognized our God in theirs."15 Schmidt follows Lang's lead but
deepens the methodological rigor brought to bear on the ethnographic
evidence. He marshals numerous scholarly judgments identifying belief
in "a genuine Supreme Being" among primitive cultures, and he argues
patiently against underestimating the sensitive religious dispositions and
theological distinctions of which such peoples are capable.16 Explanations
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of "primitive monotheism" vary, and some dispute the existence of primi
tive monotheism simpliciter, but ethnologists "nevertheless accept the
existence of a belief and cult of a supreme being among many primitive
peoples (as clearly proved by Schmidt in his UdG), no matter how this fact
is to be interpreted."17
Schellenberg's appeal to most non-Westerners and many Westerners,
allegedly incapable of getting God "squarely before their minds," is thus
unduly presumptive. His factual assumption—that unreflective nonbelief
is the rule and not the exception—is ethnographically questionable and
arguably false. Clearly, it does not follow that there are not any unreflec
tive nonbelievers. Yet the evidence does challenge the supposition that
unreflective nonbelief is commonplace. Without denying the issue of any
evil in a world with a perfect God, we must also avoid mistaking or exag
gerating what evils there may be.
Schellenberg furthermore makes a doubtful normative assumption.
Given that some fail to form the "theistic idea," or to discern the importance
of considering the possibility of such a being, he assumes their nonbelief
is inculpable. There are good reasons to resist his assumption. First, Chris
tians have long held there is something wrong with not having formed
the "theistic idea," or with being aware of the idea of God but neglecting
it. Stephen Moroney outlines the ample account of the noetic effects of sin
offered by scripture.18 Similarly, a tradition of Christian thinkers including
Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Calvin, and Edwards seem to blame unbe
lievers for their errant judgments.19 Edwards is especially clear, as William
Wainwright notes:
That "sufficient light for the knowledge of God" is available is attest
ed by scripture. It is also implied by God's purposes for humanity.
. . . So "if men have not respect to 'em as real and certain things," it
can only be from "a dreadful stupidity of mind, occasioning a sottish
insensibility of their truth and importance."20
In short, Christians ordinarily have regarded nonbelief (unreflective or
not) as culpable.
Nontheists have reason to be cautious about regarding unreflective
nonbelief as inculpable as well. Edwards stands with Socrates, Seneca, Pe
trarch, and others who urge attention to the care and improvement of the
soul alongside life's commonplace concerns. Socrates blames the Athenians
for their unreflective dispositions and their neglect of matters of ultimate
concern. Seneca faults those who "do not care how nobly they live, but
only how long, although it is within the reach of every man to live nobly,
but within no man's power to live long."21 Petrarch reproaches those who
concern themselves with the superficial and suppress mindfulness of the
significant, and specifically for "the way they shut out the thought of it
even when it is forced upon them."22 Disparate in representing ancient
Greek, imperial Roman, and medieval Christian outlooks, these three even
so share Edwards's view that neglecting "eternal things" is blameworthy.23
One need not be a theist to think human beings ought to consider such
matters, can consider such matters, and thus may be faulted when they
do not.
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Schellenberg furthermore faces a problem with what Robert Adams
calls "involuntary sins."24 While some voluntarily disregard "eternal
things," others may involuntarily but still culpably discount God's real
ity. Unfortunately, in his brief look at the issue, Schellenberg mistakes the
scope and force of involuntary sin. He oddly thinks Adams's concern is
limited to "morally repugnant beliefs," and since it is not morally repugnant
to believe that the evidence for God is ambiguous, he says involuntary
sin is "irrelevant and so may safely be disregarded" (DH, pp. 63-64). Yet
Adams addresses a gamut of blameworthy states from barely noticeable
peccadilloes to the morally reprehensible.25 If doubt about God's existence
falls short of moral reprehensibility, that doesn't make it inculpable, but
only something other than reprehensible. Not only does Schellenberg mis
take the scope of involuntary sin, he also fails to take seriously the force of
Adams's account. Wainwright points out that Schellenberg does not have
"an argument for the claim that we aren't culpable for 'involuntary sins,'
merely an appeal to intuition."26 Intuitive appeals simply will not do in the
face of Adams's nuanced account of desire, emotion, deliberation, choice,
and responsibility. Schellenberg's errors about the scope, force, and rel
evance of involuntary sin give us another reason for caution in supposing
unreflective nonbelief to be inculpable.
Finally, there is something disingenuous about his unqualified affirma
tion of the existence of inculpable, unreflective nonbelief. Why set strin
gent standards for reflective nonbelievers while ignoring such standards
for unreflective nonbelievers? Schellenberg sets the bar high for reflective
nonbelievers because he wants to be sure they are not deceptively or self
deceptively dismissive of the evidence for God's existence. Yet if reflective
persons may be deceptively or self-deceptively dismissive of the relevant
evidence about God, is there any reason to suppose that unreflective per
sons are any less disposed to deception or self-deception?
In sum, in the few words Schellenberg offers about unreflective nonbe
lief, he assumes rather than argues that it is widely instantiated, and without
making a case for it, he supposes that it is always inculpable. However, we
have reasons for supposing that "unreflective nonbelievers" are not as gen
erally thoughtless about or indifferent to God's existence as Schellenberg
assumes, so that there are far fewer of them than he imagines. We also have
cause to regard unreflective nonbelief as culpable. Not considering the sig
nificant issues of human existence-including a highest good, God, to which
unqualified commitment belo n gs-o r briefly considering and then ignor
ing such questions, is blameworthy. Human beings should consider such
questions, and they are in a position, at least sometimes, to consider such
questions unless they ignore the profound for the picayune. Not least of all,
"involuntary sin" leaves open the possibility that unreflective nonbelievers
are culpable for their nonbelief even if they do not arrive at it voluntarily.
III
Nonetheless, Schellenberg might maintain P3's truth. The odds seem to
favor it. Given billions of people, some form of reasonable nonbelief is
probably instantiated. If someone, however exceptional, through no fault
of her own fails to enjoy the benefits of divine relationship, then perhaps
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it is so much the worse for the idea of God. P3 might thus seem not only
prima facie credible, as Schellenberg argues in DH, but also secunda facie
credible despite my arguments.
Exposing two problematic positions taken by Schellenberg reveals P3's
weakness within his overall argument. One relates to his view that reason
able nonbelief of any duration constitutes an evil. The other concerns his
neglect of the epistemic implications of our social interdependence. Both
derive from another feature of his argument: Schellenberg says we must
understand divine love from above, not from below.
If we understand divine love from above, Schellenberg says we can see
that "a loving God would not permit inculpable nonbelief of any kind or
for any duration" (ORN, p. 334). He is motivated not merely by the in
trinsic attractiveness of seeing things from the divine perspective. Rightly
identifying the constitutive qualities of reasonable nonbelief depends
on seeing the issues "from above," he believes, for his "understanding
of 'reasonable' and of 'unreasonable' nonbelief is derived from reflection
on the love of God, and not determined by independent consideration of
what these notions can be taken to mean" (ORN, p. 331).
Yet however much we might try to identify with G od-em bracing God's
nature, reflecting in light of God's omniscient wisdom, and loving in the
profundity of divine ch arity -w e cannot succeed in really seeing things
from above. We must allow, then, that accounts of divine love are subject
to the limits and frailties of our view from below. Honestly appraising the
humble position we occupy reminds us that divine love could be different
from what we imagine.27
Be that as it may, Schellenberg believes that, looking from above, God
would prevent reasonable nonbelief of any kind or for any duration. This
claim seems incredible in both its typological and temporal aspects. Tak
ing the temporal portion first, consider the following:
(P2a) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief doesn't occur
for as long as five years.
(P2b) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief doesn't occur
for as long as five weeks.
(P2c) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief doesn't occur
for as long as five minutes.
Schellenberg insists that God would not allow us any diminution of epistemic access vis-a-vis God's reality for any period of time whatsoever. He
holds that divine love carries with it the necessity of our capacity for unin
terrupted discernment of God's reality, unless we culpably resist it. Taking
the typological claim in turn, consider other specifications of P2:
(P2d) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief doesn't occur
for St. John of the Cross.
(P2e) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief doesn't occur
for any novice Christian.
(P2f) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief doesn't occur
for any five-year-old child.
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Combining the temporal and typological terms, yet other possibilities
arise:
(P2 ) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief doesn't occur
for St. John of the Cross for as long as five days amidst his dark
night of the soul.
(P2h) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief doesn't occur
for any five-year-old child for as long as five minutes.
If such cases count against God's existence, it would seem something has
gone awry.
Looking at matters "from below" sheds light on the problem. To his
credit, Schellenberg allows the divine-human relationship to be under
stood developmentally. "Were it to obtain, it would admit of change,
growth, progression, regression. It might be shallow or deep, depending
on the response of the human term of the relation" (DH, p. 28). If develop
ment marks our relationship with God, then starts, halts, jumps, and rever
sals are only to be expected. The reasons why are not difficult to ascertain.
The "response of the human term of the relation" includes not only our
voluntary responses to God, but involuntary factors impinging on our re
lationship with God. Think of the forms of human limitation—of cognitive
power, attention, and stamina; of bodily appetites, exhaustion, disease,
and death; of social location and interdependence. Amidst such realities,
it is unsurprising that reasonable nonbelief of some duration arises within
human experience. Perhaps one man's attention, due to neurochemical
imbalances, fails him, and God's palpable presence one moment seems
unrecoverable the next. Maybe one woman's psychologically crippling
home life renders the trust propaedeutic to love of God beyond her, and
the idea of God's reality seems fantastical. Or suppose a child reared in the
church, given to experiencing divine benefaction during prayer and wor
ship, suffers an injury that frustrates the ease of sensing God's company.
Suppose in such cases that reasonable nonbelief obtains.28 No perfectly
loving God would allow this for even five minutes, Schellenberg thinks.
How then can the divine-human relationship "admit of change, growth,
progression, [and] regression"? Would God allow movement between the
shallow shoals and great deeps within a dynamic relationship, but never
allow anyone so much as to wonder where and whether God is? What
about the saintly such as St. John of the Cross, whose refined faith emerges
out of the crucible of God's sometime apparent absence?
Schellenberg's failure is his neglect of what we are. Essential to human
nature are the constraints of embodied, dependent rational creatures.29Were
we finite rational beings for which doubts about God were impossible, we
would be angelic, pure intellects and not interdependent, psychosomatic
amalgamations. Both our embodiment and social interdependence play
roles. Given such things as chemical imbalances, psychological trauma,
and physical injury, we can lose sight of important truths without cul
pability. We also can suffer epistemic harm through the fault of others,
including the development of belief sets that make it hard to acknowledge
God.30 To say we should be safe from reasonable nonbelief attributable to
the constraints of human nature is to say, in effect, that God should not
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have created us. We rather should say that God—in creating embodied,
socially interdependent, rational creatures—leaves open the possibility of
epistemic failure deriving from physical embodiment and social interde
pendence. It will not do to complain that God should intervene, making
his reality beyond doubt when embodied minds suffer frailty or when
epistemic harm by third parties threatens. The unfailing intervention of
a deus ex machina would play false with what we are, rendering chimeric
bodily limit and social interdependence. Ultimately, something like Carte
sian acceptance of our creaturely finitude, with gratitude for the insights
about God of which we are capable (unless resisted through our own or
another's culpability), seems the best response to the challenge of divine
hiddenness—more so than taking limited epistemic access to God's reality
as an insurmountable problem of evil.31
IV
I have expressed doubts about the kind of reasonable nonbelief needed
for Schellenberg's argument to gain traction. The dubious assumptions
he makes about unreflective nonbelief render it less useful than he imag
ines. The problem of involuntary sin leaves open another line of objec
tion. He tries to ease the burden of meeting P3 by widening the meaning
of "reasonable" based on his view of divine love. Yet the idea that God
would preclude reasonable nonbelief "of any kind or for any duration"
has defeaters grounded in human nature. In short, though he sees reason
able nonbelief as a widespread human experience, it is not as prevalent or
typically inculpable as he claims, and where we might most readily find it,
explanations saving the designs of a perfect God are available. One last is
sue merits attention: the problem of self-deception, to which I have made
passing reference above.32
Howard-Snyder and Moser see "a distinctively epistemic problem for
the proponent of the argument from divine hiddenness." It is "no easy
task to tell whether any particular candidate for inculpable nonbelief pos
sesses or fails to possess those motivations, attitudes, and dispositions that
putatively explain their inculpable nonbelief."33 This is because no matter
how one gauges honesty, scrupulousness, self-critical judgment, etc., it is
possible to subtly shade one's take on the evidence, or faintly trim one's
diligence in seeking evidence, or imperceptibly privilege one's long-held
judgments. Still, Schellenberg says "we can sometimes have good grounds
for believing an individual to be honest . . . and also that some doubters
are honest" (ORN, p. 332).
Difficulty strikes at multiple levels. First, on what grounds might one
judge oneself not to be self-deceived about the evidence for God's exis
tence? I offered a list in DRNE including "exemplary investigative proce
dure, great expenditure of time and energy, honesty in other situations,
love for truth, rational self-control, and . . . desire to have the issue re
sponsibly settled." Perhaps those qualities make a case for the non-selfdeceptiveness of someone's investigation. Other attributes might strengthen
the case. Trenchant self-criticism is good, since pride is a deadly sin and
can cause intellectual error. With Pascal, we might look for willingness to
seek "what the Church offers by way of instruction."34 Perhaps additional
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desiderata could be identified. Still other issues remain. How many of the
specified attributes must be instantiated to warrant a favorable judgment
about the adequacy of investigation? To what extent is a favorable judg
ment compromised by a failure to instantiate one or more of the speci
fied attributes? By what means may one measure the degree to which one
instantiates these desiderata?
Second, leaving aside these difficulties, cannot the specified qualities
always be self-deceptively instantiated? That one could self-deceptively
instantiate honesty, scrupulousness, and self-critical judgment means that
judgments about self-deception are deeply problematic. Shawn Floyd
asks, "If people's beliefs about themselves are shaped by unreliable doxastic practices, then how could they know whether they are self-deceived?
Their self-understanding may be shaped by beliefs that are themselves
self-deceptively produced."35 One can seem to be, to want, or to do some
thing without really being, wanting, or doing that thing. To try to appear
one way against the reality of things constitutes deception. When one is
not aware that an inconsistency exists between what-seems and what-is,
then self-deception looms. The insurmountable difficulty is that one can
seem—both to others and to oneself—to be honest about the evidence
for the reality of God without really being honest. One can appear—both
to others and to oneself—to want responsibly to resolve the question of
God's existence without really wanting to do so. One can seem—both to
others and to oneself—to engage in all of the activities conducive to ratio
nal investigation of God's existence without really doing so. One can, that
is, engage in deception and self-deception without appearing to do so.
Indeed, it is necessary that they not appear as such in order to succeed.
Successful deception and self-deception, by their very nature, are all but
undetectable to the subjects of the deception.
Third, some self-deception may be "simple," when one blatantly ne
glects one's epistemic responsibility, but most is "complex." Complex
self-deception arises when one has mixed motives, or a divided will, and
thereby can in one way claim fair judgment, but in another way can be
faulted for less than a fair judgment. One can want and not want to pos
sess the truth; one can desire and not desire to be honest. As Wainwright
observes, "the fact that many agnostics and atheists want to believe in
God is consistent with their also not wanting to do so. For both can be true
of the same person. Indeed, theists themselves often display the same
ambivalence."36 Among the epistemically responsible, self-deception is
likely complex when it occurs. As difficult as simple self-deception can
be to detect, complex self-deception is all the more intractable. This ex
plains how Schellenberg's understanding of self-deception goes wrong.
He writes,
initial awareness and deliberate forgetting [of one's neglect of the
evidence] suffice to make the neglect which one later fails to notice
voluntary, and culpable so long as it lasts. These things are also nec
essary for voluntariness and culpability in such neglect. . . . This is
important, because it shows that persons not given to dishonesty as
blatant as has just been described make very poor candidates for
doubt that is self-deceptively culpable. (ORN, p. 332)
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If all neglect were blatant, then perhaps more confidence in the capacity to
avoid, detect, or repent of it would be warranted. Belying Schellenberg's
austere depiction of human psychology, though, are the complexities of
self-deception. Since self-deception is often more subtle than brazenly de
fying duty and subsequently suppressing memory of bad faith, a more
modest finding is warranted: "Human beings are enormously compli
cated, and it is no easy task to tell . . . ."37
Schellenberg might respond that I am expressing gratuitously radi
cal doubt about human trustworthiness. Yet a wealth of social scientific
evidence suggests the ubiquity of self-deception. Floyd reports studies
showing that virtually all people think they are more intelligent than
average, more attractive than average, more deserving than others, etc.38
However innocuous such judgments may be, they demonstrate how ordi
nary self-deception is. To underestimate the possibility of self-deception,
then, would be an error (maybe even a self-deceptive error!).
Regardless, Schellenberg might say, in some cases we can discern our
susceptibility to self-deception and avoid it. After all, we sometimes see in
some people evidence of this capacity. Yet self-consciously avoiding self
deception sometimes does not guarantee the ability to do so all of the time.
Moreover, we are likely to succumb to self-deception in the matters that
concern us most, for therein do the complexities of motivation, will, and
desire render the detection of self-deception most difficult.39Bas van Frassen
sees trouble all around, for
the weights to give to different bits of evidence are not "written into"
that evidence but must be supplied by oneself; and the imagination
. . . so active in directions pleasing to oneself, or alternatively fright
ening, servant of wishes and fears, is itself the flawed mother of the
flawed queen of the world! . . . how shall we ever find a spot of safety,
secure from the distrust of one's own opinion?40
Schellenberg might also turn the tables. If those in doubt about God's ex
istence may be self-deceived, then it is also true that those who hold out
the possibility of self-deception among doubters may be self-deceived in
their judgments. In one place, he says it is sinfully uncharitable to doubt
nonbelievers' sincerity, for it constitutes "an ideologically based blindness
to the good of (some) others and inability (in some contexts) to perceive
sincerity and blamelessness. It looks a lot like a lack of openness to love."41
Failures of charity are possible. Those who doubt the existence of God
may be self-deceived about the blamelessness of their epistemic practices,
but those who—through a failure of humility or ch arity-com e to doubt
the inculpability of nonbelievers may also be self-deceived. But isn't this
just to cast all of us into a skeptical abyss? It hardly amounts to a recipe
for strengthening P3.
One need not be a Christian to question the prospect of unblemished
self-knowledge. Nietzsche observes, "we are necessarily strangers to
ourselves, we do not comprehend ourselves, we have to misunderstand
ourselves, for us the law 'Each is furthest from himself' applies to all eternity—we are not 'men of knowledge' with respect to ourselves."42 Freud's
skepticism about the human capacity for self-knowledge is equally well
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known. However, few traditions are more attuned to our flawed capacity
for self-knowledge than Christianity. Augustine, for example, writes, "For
though no one can know a man's thoughts, except the man's own spirit
that is within him, there are some things in man which even his own spirit
within him does not know."43Augustine's concern is not one of mere limit.
He asks God, "Does this remain the real truth—that I deceive myself and
neither think nor speak the truth in your sight?"44
It is not out of self-assured superiority that Christians might doubt the
honesty of others' search for God, but out of deep misgivings about any
one's ability to avoid self-deception, including themselves. Thus is it that
Christian ascetics embrace with utmost gravity the spiritual disciplines of
self-mortification and practice the same with redoubtable intensity. They
know how errant the will and the mind sometimes go, especially regard
ing spiritually significant truths.45 Here again, van Frassen delineates the
conundrum:
Beside the problems we have now about the very possibility of defin
ing the conditions under which 'He deceives himself' is true, there
are also strong doubts about whether (if there are such conditions)
we could ever have adequate reason for thinking they obtain. . . .
Once the possibility of self-deception is taken seriously it under
mines all stories . . . , including those that attribute self-deception.
We are in a quandary, personal as well as philosophical.46
Along with the other issues I have addressed, taking seriously this last in
tractable quandary should bring us all—Schellenberg along with his favor
able and critical reviewers—to question whether there exists the reasonable
nonbelief needed for his argument's success. Where truly reasonable non
belief is most probably instantiated, say in the examples explored in section
III, it seems to pose no real difficulty for God's existence. Equally important,
for the reasons discussed in section II reasonable nonbelief is simply not the
pervasive evil Schellenberg thinks it to be. Finally, over all instances of ap
parently reasonable nonbelief hovers the shadow of self-deception. Given
the issues, it would be precipitous for Christians to forfeit belief in God
because of Schellenberg's argument. Moreover, it would also be premature,
pace Schellenberg, for those "who doubt or weakly believe . . . [to] come to
believe that there is no God" (DH, p. 213).
Baylor University
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